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Abstract
Why does patience vary across individuals and countries? We provide evi-
dence on a widely-hypothesized mechanism, namely that higher longevity fos-
ters patience. Using data on patience for 80,000 individuals in 76 countries, this
paper relates exogenous variation in longevity across gender-age-country cells
to variation in patience. We find that a ten-year increase in life expectancy im-
plies a 5-percentage point higher discount factor. This relationship emerges for
various sub-samples and is unaffected by other determinants including lifetime
experiences regarding economic development, institutional quality, or violence.
We provide a model to discuss the implications for the emergence of poverty
traps.
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1 Introduction
Patience constitutes a fundamental determinant of any inter-temporal choice and
is generally viewed as a key primitive in both macroeconomic and microeconomic
models. Empirical work has presented evidence that variation in patience accounts
for a considerable part of the observed heterogeneity in education, savings and per-
capita income across individuals, regions as well as across countries (Borghans et al.,
2008; Sutter et al., 2013; Dohmen et al., 2018). However, little is known about the
determinants of patience.
This paper provides direct evidence for the most prominent hypothesis proposed
in the literature, namely that greater longevity leads to greater patience and more
future-oriented behavior (Becker and Mulligan, 1997).
Testing this hypothesis requires data on patience that fulfill two key requirements.
First, the measure of patience needs to be reliable and predictive of real-world be-
havior. Second, to identify an effect of longevity on patience, the data sample must
exhibit plausibly exogenous variation in longevity. We employ a global dataset of
individual patience endowments that fulfills these requirements (Falk et al., 2018).
Our measure of patience is elicited by two survey items involving (i) a choice between
immediate and delayed monetary rewards and (ii) a self-assessment of the willingness
to delay rewards to the future. Both survey items were selected through a rigorous
ex-ante experimental selection and validation procedure, thereby ensuring that the
survey items are predictive of incentivized economic behavior. The patience mea-
sures are elicited for a total of 80,000 individuals in 76 representative country samples
that cover all continents and a broad range of economic development providing large
variation in longevity levels.
Our identification strategy makes use of objective and exogenous variation in
individual life expectancy by combining the individual patience data with granular
data from period life tables provided by the Population Division of the United Na-
tions. These life tables contain information about the expected remaining years of
life for a given gender-age cell in a particular country. To establish a plausibly causal
relationship between longevity and patience we apply an identification strategy that
relates variation in longevity across gender-age-country cells from period life tables
to variation in patience. Importantly, this identification strategy isolates the esti-
mated effect from any systematic differences across countries, age groups and gender
groups by applying the logic of a differences-in-difference design.
To illustrate our identification strategy, consider two individuals aged 20 and 50
from the US and two individuals of the same ages from South Africa. We calculate
the difference in patience between the 20- and 50-year old in the US in comparison
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to the difference between the 20- and 50-year old in South Africa. We then relate
the resulting difference-in-differences to the corresponding differences in expected
remaining years of life to obtain an estimate of the effect of longevity on patience.
Two aspects of our identification strategy are particularly noteworthy. First, our
approach isolates the effect of longevity from other country-specific confounding fac-
tors shared by individuals from the same country. Potential candidate confounds
that may influence patience but are isolated by this strategy include variation in in-
stitutional quality or economic development. Following a similar logic, our approach
separates the effect of longevity from all age-specific confounding factors shared by
individuals of the same age. For instance, patience may follow age patterns that
are predetermined by biological or evolutionary factors. Second, the measures of
expected remaining years of life from period life tables reflect the life expectancy
for an individual of a particular age if they experienced the (age-specific) mortality
rates of the given period throughout the remaining life. This implies that expected
remaining life years are based on mortality patterns of older cohorts and hence plau-
sibly exogenous to the actions of the individuals of the respective age group. This
rules out any reverse causality from patience to longevity, which would be a concern
when using subjective beliefs about health and longevity.
Our main result provides evidence for a significant positive effect of longevity
on patience. In quantitative terms, a ten-year increase in life expectancy leads to a
5-percentage point increase in the discount factor, constructed from the quantitative
patience measure. This effect is robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control
variables. In particular, our point estimates are unaffected when accounting for
variation in religion, language and potentially endogenous variables such as proxies
for cognitive ability and education.
We provide several additional pieces of evidence that shed light on the robust-
ness, underlying mechanisms, and consequences of this effect. First, the positive
association of patience with longevity holds for all geographic regions of the world
and is present for both women and men. Second, there is no significant association
between variation in longevity and other preference measures such as risk attitudes,
altruism, trust or negative reciprocity with longevity. Only for positive reciprocity
a similar, albeit smaller, effect emerges. This finding is consistent with the intu-
ition that longevity favors repeated interactions, creating incentives for engaging in
positively reciprocal behavior. Third, our point estimates are virtually unaffected
when using alternative data or measures of longevity. Fourth, to further mitigate
concerns about simultaneity, we instrument current remaining years of life with val-
ues based on earlier cohorts, yielding similar results. Fifth, we test for robustness
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against lifetime experience effects on patience arising from experienced economic
development, institutional quality, or political violence throughout an individual’s
life course. While our results indicate that such experiences may have an effect on
patience, the association of patience with longevity remains unaffected. Sixth, we
document an effect of subjectively-perceived health on patience. However, this effect
appears to be independent as the impact of objective remaining years of life remains
virtually unaffected by including the control for subjective health status. Finally, we
provide a theoretical model that highlights the consequences of this finding for the
emergence of poverty traps through a vicious cycle of high mortality, low patience,
and low human capital investments.
In documenting a sizable and significant positive effect of individual life ex-
pectancy on patience, this paper contributes to the understanding of the deter-
minants of time preferences. Time preferences are an important determinant for
economic outcomes, see Mischel et al. (1989), Chabris et al. (2008), Sutter et al.
(2013), and Figlio et al. (2016) for evidence on the level of the individual; see also
Falk et al. (2019), which includes an overview table of papers relating preferences to
outcomes. Recent work by Dohmen et al. (2018) has provided evidence for the role
of patience for economic development at both the individual and the aggregate level.
Only a few studies have investigated the determinants of patience, providing evi-
dence for the role of geographic factors, including in particular agricultural suitability
(Galor and Özak, 2016), historical migration patterns (Becker et al., 2018), and lan-
guage (Chen, 2013; Falk et al., 2018). This paper complements this literature by
pointing towards the crucial role of health and longevity for patience. Our results
also complement findings regarding the importance of lifetime experiences for (risk)
preference formation (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016) by reporting qualitatively
similar results for the domain of time preferences and showing that longevity has a
distinct influence on patience.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the
data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section
4 concludes by discussing the implications of the empirical findings for long-run
development.
2 Data and Empirical Framework
2.1 Patience
Our data stems from the Global Preference Survey (GPS) (Falk et al., 2018). The
GPS is a newly-constructed cross-sectional dataset containing measures of funda-
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mental economic preferences for approximately 80,000 individuals in representative
samples from 76 countries (see Online Appendix Figure A1 for a world map of coun-
tries covered in the data). The countries selected for the survey cover all continents
and represent a total of 90% of the world’s income and population. The elicitation
was implemented as part of the Gallup World Poll using the same survey infrastruc-
ture.
The GPS contains two measures of patience that are relevant for the purpose
of this study, a quantitative revealed preference measure of patience that captures
respondents’ indifference point between a payment today and a payment with 12
months delay, and a qualitative measure capturing the respondents’ subjective as-
sessment of their patience. The quantitative item presents the participants with a
sequence of five interdependent trade-off questions:
“Suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or
a payment in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The
payment today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in 12
months is different in every situation. For each of these situations we would
like to know which you would choose. Please assume there is no inflation, i.e,
future prices are the same as today’s prices. Please consider the following:
Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or x Euro in 12 months?”
By varying the amount x, we obtain the indifference point between a payment on
the day of the survey and a payment 12 months later which serves as a quantitative
measure of patience. The precise elicitation protocol is shown in Appendix D. The
qualitative survey item asks participants:
“How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in
order to benefit more from that in the future? Please indicate your answer
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are ‘completely unwilling to do
so’ and a 10 means you are ‘very willing to do so’. You can also use any
numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.”
These two survey items were selected through a rigorous, ex-ante experimental
validation before the implementation in the international survey. In this procedure,
subjects responded to survey questions but also participated in incentivized state-
of-the-art choice experiments. Out of a large set of survey questions, the two survey
items were selected for the international survey as the best joint predictors of incen-
tivized behavior. After the implementation of the worldwide survey in 2012, the final
measure for patience was generated according to the following procedure. First, each
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of the two survey items was standardized using the mean and variance of the entire
worldwide sample. Next, the relevant z-scores were averaged using weights developed
in the experimental validation. Finally, the combined measure was standardized on
the worldwide sample to exhibit a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. For
further details on the GPS data, see Falk et al. (2018).
2.2 Longevity
We combine the individual-level patience measures with granular period life table
data from the Population Division of the United Nations.1 These period life tables
provide information about the values of age-specific mortality for gender-age-country
cells and can be used to compute the life expectancy in terms of remaining years of
life for each gender-age-country cell.
The mortality data by age and gender are obtained from vital registration sys-
tems in each country in a given year that are reported to either the United Nations
Statistics Division or the World Health Organization (WHO) and combined with
data from population censuses to obtain mortality patterns in given years.2 The use
of period life table information implies that the respective remaining years of life for
individuals in a particular gender-age-country cell are based on mortality information
from older cohorts.
Provided that past mortality patterns are stable, the life table information pro-
vides a valid measure of the average longevity expectation for individuals (Smith
et al., 2001) and is likely to be more accurate and reliable than subjective beliefs
(Hamermesh, 1985; Elder, 2013). For robustness checks, we also make use of alter-
native life table data provided by the The Human Mortality Database.3
2.3 Descriptive Evidence and Empirical Strategy
Does longevity affect patience? A first and cursory look at the empirical relevance
of the conjectured influence can be obtained by considering the patience data at the
country-level. Figure 1 shows that longevity and patience are indeed strongly and
positively correlated across countries.4 However, this correlation is likely to suffer
from reverse causality problems and omitted variable bias. Specifically, forward-
looking and more patient individuals and countries may be more likely to under-
1See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/
index.shtml.
2See also http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/LT_method.pdf for details on the
methodology.
3See www.mortality.org.
4For a world map of country-level mean patience see Online Appendix Figure A1.
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take investments in their health or implement better, health-promoting, institutions.
Furthermore, other potential determinants of patience, such as historical and insti-
tutional factors, might be correlated with life expectancy, giving rise to a spurious
relationship.
Figure 1: Patience and Life Expectancy
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(b) Conditional on Observables
Notes: Figure 1(a) illustrates the association of country-level patience with life
expectancy at birth at the country level unconditionally and Figure 1(b) shows
the same association conditional on control variables. Controls include indi-
cators for geographic region, absolute latitude, land suitability for agriculture,
avg. temperature, avg. precipitation, timing of neolithic revolution, percentage
living in (sub-)tropical zones.
Hence, an empirical analysis relying on plain cross-country variation in levels of
longevity is not suited to identify the effect of longevity on patience. To obtain
a credible causal estimate of this effect, we propose an identification strategy that
exploits differences in the remaining years of life across age cells, conditional on
country and age fixed effects. Intuitively, the source of identifying variation is the
difference in remaining years of life between young and old individuals in a particular
country relative to the differences in remaining years of life between young and old
individuals in another country. Gender-specific remaining years of life for a given age-
country combination serve as an additional source of variation. We use the variation
in expected remaining life years across gender-age-country cells and relate it to the
variation in patience across the corresponding cells.
Formally, we regress individual-level patience βigac on the expected remaining
years of life piigac of an individual i of gender g and age a in country c, controlling
for gender ζg, a vector of age fixed effects δa, a vector of country fixed effects αc, and
additional potentially relevant individual characteristics Xigac,
βigac = γ · piigac + ζg + δa + αc + ρ ·Xigac + εigac, (1)
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where εigac captures an idiosyncratic error term. To facilitate readibility, the patience
measure is multiplied by 100. In the baseline analysis, we cluster standard errors at
the country level.
In light of the results in Falk et al. (2018), the vector of individual characteristics
X in the baseline specification includes gender, subjective math skills as proxy for
cognitive ability, education and the log of household income per capita. Summary
statistics of the variables contained in the baseline analysis are displayed in Online
Appendix Tables A1 and A2.
The intuition behind the identification strategy is similar to a difference-in-
differences approach, as the model uses variation in life expectancy between different
age groups in different countries and relates it to the corresponding variation in pa-
tience. Importantly, the measure of remaining years of life is constructed based on
mortality rates of past cohorts. This captures the best statistical prediction of the
remaining life time of an individual in a particular age-gender-country cell without
being prone to potential endogeneity problems at the individual level. Concerns
about reverse causality are hence mitigated, as the life expectancy measure cannot
be altered by the behavior of a given individual or even a gender-age cohort. For this
reason, the use of life-table information has a distinct advantage over using subjective
measures or beliefs of life expectancy.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Baseline Results
Table 1 presents the main results. The baseline specification in Column (1) docu-
ments a substantial positive association between the expected length of the remaining
lifetime and individual patience. A one-year increase in remaining years of life is as-
sociated with a 0.0163 (s.e.=0.004) standard deviation increase in patience. Adding
other, potentially endogenous, individual-level controls such as cognitive ability, ed-
ucation, or log household income per capita as in Column (2) yields a virtually
unaffected point estimate of 0.0173 (s.e.=0.004). We obtain similar point estimates
when controlling for within-country regions instead of country fixed effects in Column
(3). In addition, given previous evidence emphasizing the potential role of religion
(Becker and Woessmann, 2009) or language (Chen, 2013) for education and future
orientation, we control for religion and language in Columns (4) to (6). We obtain
virtually identical results when controlling for these factors separately or all factors
jointly.
In order to quantify the effect sizes, we repeat the estimation using the discount
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Table 1: Longevity and Patience at the Individual Level
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.63∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.376) (0.375) (0.381) (0.413) (0.423)
1 if female -13.5∗∗∗ -11.5∗∗∗ -11.6∗∗∗ -10.8∗∗∗ -12.4∗∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗
(2.246) (2.207) (2.209) (2.294) (2.295) (2.422)
Subj. math skills 2.24∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.191) (0.218) (0.209) (0.195)
Education level 8.58∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 8.73∗∗∗ 9.71∗∗∗
(1.381) (1.303) (1.356) (1.457) (1.416)
Log [Household income p/c] 3.28∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗
(0.562) (0.553) (0.581) (0.607) (0.627)
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No Yes No No Yes
Religion FE No No No Yes No Yes
Language FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 79433 77693 76793 69245 71987 62691
R2 0.161 0.172 0.218 0.176 0.184 0.232
Notes: Table 1 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience on remaining years
of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects and different sets
of control variables. In the specifications using within-country region fixed effects, no
country fixed effects are included as they are collinear. Patience is standardized to exhibit
a standard deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
factor as the dependent variable. More specifically, we replicate the analysis using
only the quantitative survey item that elicits a participant’s indifference point be-
tween a payment of 100 Euros today and a payment of x Euros in one year. Hence,
the value of x for which the individual is indifferent directly pins down the yearly
discount factor as D(x) = 100
x
.5 Using the value of D(x) as the dependent variable
delivers coefficient estimates that allow for a straightforward quantitative interpre-
tation of the effect of a one-year increase in longevity on the discount factor over a
one-year horizon. Given that our elicitation procedure invokes bounds on the dis-
count factor, we estimate Tobit regressions. The results indicate that 10 more years
of expected remaining life time are associated with an increase in the discount factor
by 5-6 percent (Online Appendix Table A3).
The findings remain robust in various alternative specifications. In particular, the
findings are unaffected when conducting inference based on alternative assumptions
about cross-sectional dependencies and applying two-way clustering on country and
5The implicit assumption is that utility is approximately linear for the stakes involved in this
trade-off.
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age (Online Appendix Table A4). Moreover, the effect of longevity robustly emerges
across various geographic sub-samples and for women and men separately (Online
Appendix Table A5).6
Are other preferences similarly affected by longevity? The GPS data also contain
measures of other preferences related to risk taking, altruism, trust, and positive and
negative reciprocity, which were elicited in comparable ways to patience by using
a combination of qualitative and quantitative survey items (see Falk et al., 2018).
While these preferences might also be influenced by longevity, it is conceptually much
less obvious to formulate clear empirical hypotheses.7 We replicate the analysis for
other preference measures to explore whether the effect of life expectancy is unique
to time preferences or whether it also applies to other preferences. The results
document no significant effect of expected remaining life years on any other preference
measure, with the exception of positive reciprocity (Online Appendix Table A6).
The positive effect on positive reciprocity appears plausible in light of the intrinsic
relation between reciprocity and future-oriented behavior, whereby individuals who
are willing to reciprocate invest resources today to reap potential social benefits in
the future (Kreps et al., 1982).
3.2 Alternative Measures of Longevity and Instrumental Vari-
ables
The results are unchanged when using alternative measures of life expectancy. To
demonstrate this, we use alternative life table data from theHuman Mortality Database
to compute the remaining years of life for each country-age-gender cell. The results
are also robust when longevity is conceptualized as the inverse of the probability of
dying within the next year, which captures a more immediate or short-term measure
of mortality rather than focusing on the entire remaining life span (Online Appendix
Table A7).
Complementarily, we also applied an instrumental variable approach that uses the
life expectancy of particular age-gender cells in a given country for earlier periods to
instrument life expectancy for the period of observation. In our main specification,
reverse causality is unlikely as a consequence of the construction of the measures of
longevity: as expected remaining years of life is based on the mortality rates of past
6The effect is in fact largely comparable in size across geographic world regions, but somewhat
smaller in less developed countries, in particular in African countries and the Middle East. More-
over, the effect of remaining lifetime on patience is positive and significant for both women and
men, but larger for women than for men.
7Moreover, this analysis contributes to previous research that has found systematic age patterns
in preferences, see e.g. Dohmen et al. (2017) for the context of risk preferences.
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cohorts, it cannot be directly affected by the patience endowment of an individual
in the particular age group. Nevertheless, one might be worried about simultaneity
bias. To investigate the robustness of the results and address potential measurement
error, we use life table information for 2000, 1990, 1980, and 1970, respectively, to
instrument the measure of remaining years of life computed from the period life
table for 2010 that has been used in the baseline analysis. The variation used for
identification thus pertains to age-specific mortality of cohorts even further in the
past. The second-stage results reveal that the coefficient on remaining years of life
is statistically significant in all specifications and quantitatively almost identical to
the baseline estimates (Online Appendix Table A7).8
3.3 Alternative Explanations and Mechanisms
Lifetime Experiences: Development and Institutions. Life expectancy in
terms of remaining years of life for an individual in a given age-gender-country cell
appears to be a strong predictor of individual patience conditional on country- and
age-specific effects. A potential concern regarding this finding involves other factors
that vary by age-gender-country cells conditional on country- and age-specific effects.
Most importantly, certain lifetime experiences that are crucial for the formation of
patience might vary at this level. For instance, the differences in institutional quality
over the life course experienced by a 50-year old in the United States and a 50-year old
in South Africa might be fundamentally distinct from the corresponding differences
experienced by two 20-year olds.
Generally, experience effects – for instance, of economic hardship in times of a
depression – have been shown in the context of willingness to take risks (Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011, 2016). Other studies find that income, socio-economic background
and living conditions in general affect preferences (Tanaka et al., 2010; Fehr and
Haushofer, 2014; Falk et al., 2019; Kosse et al., 2019). Likewise, institutional quality
has been argued to influence cultural norms, which might include future orientation
(Lowes et al., 2017). Moreover, violent conflict has been identified as a source of vari-
ation in the willingness to take risks (Callen et al., 2014) and individual exposure
to an institutional environment has been shown to affect preferences for democracy
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015). Finally, the subjective perception of insti-
tutional quality or the risk of expropriation and violence might influence individual
patience. Consequently, the perception of a very unsafe environment may prevent
8We present the first-stage estimates in Online Appendix Table A8. The first-stage results of
this exercise reveal that remaining years of life computed from life tables in the past are strong
predictors of remaining years of life in the present, with F-statistics exceeding 10 in all specifications.
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individuals from undertaking investments with future rewards, for instance in edu-
cation (Acemoglu et al., 2014).
In order to test whether such experience effects might explain our results, for
each cohort in each country we construct average lifetime values for experienced log
GDP per capita using data from the Maddison Project, institutional quality using
the Polity IV index from the Polity IV Project, democracy using data from Freedom
House, and political violence using information from the Peace Research Institute
Oslo. These variables also exhibit variation across age-country cells and thus allow
for a conceptually similar identification as the measure for remaining years of life.9
In addition, we also use a measure of subjectively-perceived institutional quality
as reported by respondents to the Gallup World Poll. For individual decision-making,
subjective perceptions about institutional quality are potentially more important
than the objectively experienced institutional environment. However, in contrast
to the other institutional background variables, which exhibit plausibly exogenous
variation in the present context, subjective perceptions might constitute a bad control
(in the sense of Angrist and Pischke, 2006, p. 64.). We nevertheless include this
variable in some of the analysis to explore the implications for the coefficient of
interest.
Table 2 shows empirical results from the estimation of an extended specifica-
tion that includes remaining years of life as well as measures of lifetime experiences,
separately as well as jointly. The findings reveal no systematic association between
patience and experienced log GDP per capita, a marginally significant association
with experienced institutional quality, and negative associations with experienced po-
litical violence. The results also show a positive and significant relationship between
patience and subjective institutional quality. In sum, this evidence suggests that
certain life time experiences – particularly in terms of the institutional environment
– indeed matter for the formation of patience.
The regressions also show, however, that the effect of remaining years of life on
patience is essentially unaffected by the effects of these lifetime experiences. Addi-
tional robustness checks focusing on income, institutional quality or democracy and
violence at birth or the age of 15 instead of aggregating over the life cycle provide
very similar conclusions (Online Appendix Tables A9 and A10). In sum, these results
support the conjecture that the impact of longevity on patience is largely unaffected
by potential experience effects or subjective perceptions of institutional quality.
9The only difference is that the measures of experiences exhibit no variation across gender
groups.
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Table 2: Life Expectancy and Patience: The Role of Life Experiences of Development and Institu-
tions
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Remaining years of life 1.62∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.379) (0.377) (0.397) (0.380) (0.387) (0.424) (0.448)
Avg. log GDP p/c lifetime 5.14 7.20 8.03
(5.235) (5.251) (8.638)
Avg. institutional quality lifetime 0.89∗ 1.49∗∗ 1.53∗∗
(0.455) (0.575) (0.622)
Avg. democracy lifetime 6.49 -10.0 -11.4
(6.494) (7.411) (8.152)
Avg. societal political violence lifetime -2.46∗∗ -1.92∗∗ -2.13
(1.137) (0.866) (1.325)
Avg. interstate political violence lifetime -6.71 -4.94 -5.20
(4.385) (4.127) (4.878)
Subjective institutional quality 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77693 77693 77693 77693 58062 77693 77693 58062
R2 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.167 0.172 0.172 0.167
Notes: Table 2 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience on remaining years of life controlling for gender,
country fixed effects, age fixed effects, experienced development and institutional quality. Additional controls include
subjective math skills, education level, and log household income per capita. Patience is standardized to exhibit a
standard deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Subjective Health Status and the Formation of Patience. The results so far
are strongly suggestive of an important role of longevity for patience. Importantly,
the identification has been based on longevity measured by the expected remain-
ing years of life from period life tables, i.e., based on period mortality, which refers
to previous cohorts in the respective age-gender-country cells. This captures unbi-
ased and objective information about the remaining life time for an individual in a
given gender-age-country cell. Recent evidence has pointed to the influence of health
perceptions for individual subjective life expectancy, which itself is a predictor of
individual mortality (van Solinge and Henkens, 2018).
In order to explore the role of subjective health conditions for patience and assess
the robustness of the results obtained with objective longevity information from life
tables, we repeat the analysis controlling for subjective health perceptions.10 When
interpreting these results, however, it is necessary to keep in mind, that similar
to subjective perceptions about institutional quality, subjectively-perceived health
status might be prone to endogeneity or simultaneity problems.
Table 3 presents the corresponding estimation results, which indeed show that
individuals with a better subjective perception of their health status also exhibit
greater patience, conditional on age and other control variables. Nevertheless, the
effect of the objective measure of average remaining years of life based on life table
statistics remains significant and quantitatively virtually unchanged compared to the
baseline results.
Finally, we investigate whether expected longevity forms patience early in life or
whether patience is predominantly determined by contemporaneous life expectancy.
To do so, we add to our baseline specification as an additional independent variable
the expected length of an individual at their birth.11
The results in Online Appendix Table A11 affirm the robust effects of contem-
poraneous life expectancy with coefficients similar to the baseline specifications in
Table 1. In contrast, there is no robust effect of life expectancy at birth. These
results underscore that an individual’s patience endowment is not fixed but rather a
function of the contemporaneous life expectancy, consistent with the conjecture by
Becker and Mulligan (1997).
10Individual health perceptions are measured in terms of a personal health index that is con-
structed from combining individual responses to six questions about self-reported personal health
assessments. These include satisfaction with personal health, health problems leading to behavioral
limitations, and perception of stress, physical pain, worries, or sadness.
11Information on life expectancy at birth is taken from past period life tables provided by the
Population Division of the United Nations. As these data are only available back to 1950, we
conduct a linear extrapolation to impute life expectancy at birth for older cohorts.
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Table 3: Life Expectancy and Patience: The Role of Subjective Health Perceptions
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.72∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗
(0.369) (0.382) (0.383) (0.389) (0.420) (0.432)
Subjective health perceptions 0.13∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No Yes No No Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion FE No No No Yes No Yes
Language FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 77411 75707 74807 67353 70001 60799
R2 0.151 0.161 0.208 0.164 0.173 0.221
Notes: Table 3 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience on remaining years of life
controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects, subjective health perceptions
and different sets of control variables. Additional controls include subjective math skills,
education level, and log household income per capita In the specifications using within-
country region fixed effects, no country fixed effects are included as they are collinear.
Patience is standardized to exhibit a standard deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered
at the country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
4 Discussion
Patience constitutes a fundamental determinant of inter-temporal choices and eco-
nomic outcomes in canonical models of economic behavior. This paper contributes
to the small body of literature on the determinants of patience by providing ev-
idence for the impact of a widely-hypothesized factor: longevity. Using globally
representative data on patience in combination with plausibly exogenous variation
in country-specific and cohort-specific longevity, we establish a quantitatively sub-
stantial and robust empirical link between patience and expected life time. In more
detail, greater longevity is associated with higher patience: a 10-year increase in
remaining years of life implies a 5-percentage point increase in the discount factor.
This finding emerges robustly for various sub-samples and different proxies for
longevity, as well as when applying instrumental variable estimations. We also show
that potential experience effects arising from experienced economic development,
institutional quality, or violence over the life course might affect patience but do not
affect the main result for longevity.
The significant positive effect of longevity on patience can have far-reaching im-
plications for the emergence of poverty traps. Recent work on poverty traps has
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isolated various factors that can lead to detrimental feedback loops, including bio-
physical and psychological factors, low levels or loss of human capital, bad health
conditions, or financial market imperfections (see the introductory discussion by Bar-
rett et al. (2019) and the contributions in their collected volume). Past research has
argued that improvements in life expectancy are crucial for countries’ transition from
quasi-stagnation to sustained growth due to their effects on human capital invest-
ment (Cervellati and Sunde, 2005; Castello-Climent and Domenech, 2008; Cervellati
and Sunde, 2015).
As patience is also a crucial determinant of health and human capital invest-
ments (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009; Fortson, 2011; Oster et al., 2013),
our evidence provides scope for a negative feedback effect that amplifies the con-
sequences of bad health and low life expectancy for long-run development. Such a
longevity-patience development trap arises through a vicious cycle of high mortality,
low patience, and low investments into human capital and health. Vice versa, the re-
sults suggest that improvements in longevity, for instance as a consequence of health
interventions, imply greater patience and thereby propel long-term investments and
ultimately boost a county’s economic development.
In Section C in the Appendix, we formalize these intuitions in a simple overlap-
ping generations model that captures the interdependencies between patience and
longevity and that highlights the potential for a longevity-patience poverty trap. This
mechanism complements standard mechanisms leading to poverty traps, which are
usually related to either external frictions or non-homothetic preferences (Ghatak,
2015). At the same time, the link between health and patience extends previous
work on endogenous time preferences (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Strulik, 2012).
In sum, the evidence presented in this paper points towards an important feed-
back loop between bio-physical and psychological factors that can have important
consequences for development. In terms of policy implications, our findings sug-
gest that health interventions that improve longevity might have positive externali-
ties: besides increasing individual productivity and well-being, higher longevity shifts
greater weight to future outcomes, thereby fostering future-oriented decision-making
such as investment in human or physical capital.
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A Online Appendix Figures
Figure A1: World Maps
(a) Data Availability
(b) Country-level Patience
Notes: Figure A1(a) provides a world map of countries covered in the data.
Figure A1(b) visualizes mean country-level patience across countries.
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B Online Appendix Tables
Table A1: Summary Statistics: Main Variables
Baseline Specification
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Patience 0.00 100.00 -131 276 79,730
Remaining years of life 36.21 14.43 2 72 80,021
1 if female 0.55 0.50 0 1 80,337
Age 41.82 17.49 15 99 80,061
Subj. math skills 5.18 2.82 0 10 79,211
Education level 1.86 0.66 1 3 79,945
Log [Household income p/c] 7.92 1.52 -4 15 79,848
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Table A2: Summary Statistics: Additional Variables
Additional Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Discount Factor 0.56 0.16 0 1 74,124
Remaining years of life (mortality.org) 33.20 15.45 2 72 25,419
1/(Probablity of Dying) 616.40 839.76 4 7,933 79,498
Avg. log GDP p/c lifetime 8.26 1.16 0 10 80,061
Avg. institutional quality lifetime 2.03 5.97 -10 10 80,061
Avg. democracy lifetime 0.53 0.41 0 1 80,061
Subjective institutional quality 49.08 35.47 0 100 60,096
Avg. societal political violence lifetime 0.97 1.54 0 8 80,061
Avg. interstate political violence lifetime 0.21 0.49 0 4 80,061
Will. to take risks -0.00 100.00 -187 247 79,703
Altruism -0.00 100.00 -261 233 79,903
Trust 0.00 100.00 -197 168 78,774
Positive reciprocity 0.00 100.00 -384 133 80,189
Negative reciprocity 0.00 100.00 -159 233 78,536
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Table A3: Life Expectancy and Patience: Quantitative Effects
Dependent variable: Discount factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
1 if female -0.039∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
Subj. math skills 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Education level 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No Yes No No Yes
Religion FE No No No Yes No Yes
Language FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 73887 72454 71732 64872 67075 58814
Notes: Online Appendix Table A3 presents Tobit estimates of a regression of the discount factor
on remaining years of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects and different
sets of control variables. In the specifications using within-country region fixed effects, no country
fixed effects are included as they are collinear. Standard errors clustered at the country level in
parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A4: Life Expectancy and Patience: Inference with two-way clustered S.E.
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.63∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.391) (0.380) (0.394) (0.437) (0.438)
1 if female -13.5∗∗∗ -11.5∗∗∗ -11.6∗∗∗ -10.8∗∗∗ -12.4∗∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗
(2.331) (2.291) (2.265) (2.386) (2.437) (2.561)
Subj. math skills 2.24∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.184) (0.212) (0.198) (0.189)
Education level 8.58∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 8.73∗∗∗ 9.71∗∗∗
(1.379) (1.303) (1.366) (1.463) (1.435)
Log [Household income p/c] 3.28∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗
(0.576) (0.559) (0.610) (0.621) (0.638)
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No Yes No No Yes
Religion FE No No No Yes No Yes
Language FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 79433 77693 76793 69245 71987 62691
R2 0.161 0.172 0.218 0.176 0.184 0.232
Notes: Online Appendix Table A4 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience on
remaining years of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects and
different sets of control variables. In the specifications using within-country region fixed
effects, no country fixed effects are included as they are collinear. Patience is standardized
to exhibit a standard deviation of 100. Standard errors two-way clustered at country and
age level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A6: Longevity and Other Preferences
Alternative Outcome
Dep. Var.: Risk Taking Altruism Trust Pos. Recip. Neg. Recip.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Remaining years of life 0.69 -0.050 -0.57 0.92∗∗∗ 0.56
(0.596) (0.381) (0.437) (0.343) (0.431)
1 if female -19.5∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 8.65∗∗∗ 1.93 -15.0∗∗∗
(2.687) (2.066) (2.240) (1.805) (1.820)
Subj. math skills 4.01∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 5.88∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗
(0.345) (0.308) (0.271) (0.264) (0.418)
Education level 7.27∗∗∗ 7.66∗∗∗ -4.39∗∗∗ 7.68∗∗∗ -0.28
(1.029) (1.211) (1.309) (1.112) (1.002)
Log [Household income p/c] 5.26∗∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗ -0.97 2.82∗∗∗ 1.56∗
(0.680) (0.615) (0.661) (0.720) (0.904)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77641 77822 77040 78053 76728
R2 0.174 0.139 0.113 0.131 0.113
Notes: Online Appendix Table A6 presents OLS estimates of a regression of different prefer-
ences on remaining years of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects
and additional controls that include subjective math skills, education level, and log household
income per capita. All preferences are standardized to exhibit a standard deviation of 100.
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A7: Longevity and Patience: Alternative Measures of Mortality and Instrumental Variables
Dependent variable: Patience
Alternative Measures Instrument: Remaining years of life in...
2000 1990 1980 1970
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.78∗∗∗
(mortality.org) (0.621)
1/(Probablity of Dying) 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.001)
Remaining years of life 1.72∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗
(instrumented) (0.373) (0.399) (0.465) (0.424)
1 if female -19.9∗∗∗ -7.21∗∗∗ -11.5∗∗∗ -10.4∗∗∗ -11.3∗∗∗ -12.6∗∗∗
(3.741) (1.308) (2.107) (2.178) (2.320) (2.242)
Subj. math skills 2.79∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.207)
Education level 20.2∗∗∗ 8.85∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 8.59∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 8.56∗∗∗
(2.242) (1.408) (1.373) (1.370) (1.375) (1.376)
Log [Household income p/c] 9.37∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗
(1.201) (0.571) (0.557) (0.552) (0.552) (0.557)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24716 77235 77693 77693 77693 77693
R2 0.218 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) of Online Appendix Table A7 present OLS estimates of a regression
of patience on two measures of longevity controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed
effects, development and additional controls that include subjective math skills, education level,
and log household income per capita. Columns (3) to (6) present IV estimates of a regression
of patience on remaining years of life controlling for the same control variables. Instruments
employed are the remaining years of life for a given gender-age-country cell in previous decades
(for the first stage see Online Appendix Table A8. Patience is standardized to exhibit a standard
deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A8: Life Expectancy and Patience: IV Estimates (First Stage)
First Stage
Dep. Variable: Remaining years of life (2010)
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 2000 0.63∗∗∗
(0.049)
Remaining years of life 1990 0.78∗∗∗
(0.068)
Remaining years of life 1980 0.63∗∗∗
(0.167)
Remaining years of life 1970 0.75∗∗∗
(0.074)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77693 77693 77693 77693
F 162.66 131.98 14.27 102.76
Notes: Online Appendix Table A8 presents the first-stage estimates
of the IV regressions in Columns (3) to (6) of Online Appendix Table
A7. Additional controls include subjective math skills, education
level, and log household income per capita.
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Table A9: Life Expectancy and Patience: Experience Effects (Robustness 1: At Birth)
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.45∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.378) (0.373) (0.374) (0.371) (0.399)
Log GDP p/c at birth 3.33∗ 2.10
(1.832) (1.588)
Inst. quality at birth 0.037 0.062
(0.139) (0.174)
Democracy at birth -0.11 -1.55
(1.728) (2.050)
Societal pol. violence at birth -0.47 -0.45
(0.364) (0.359)
Interstate pol. violence at birth 0.27 0.32
(0.694) (0.554)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77693 77693 77693 77693 77693 77693
R2 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172
Notes: Online Appendix Table A9 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience
on remaining years of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects,
development and institutional quality experienced at birth. Additional controls include
subjective math skills, education level, and log household income per capita. Patience
is standardized to exhibit a standard deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered at the
country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A10: Life Expectancy and Patience: Experience Effects (Robustness 2: At Age 15)
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.71∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.371) (0.370) (0.371) (0.372) (0.376)
Log GDP p/c at age 15 -0.40 -0.92
(1.360) (1.350)
Inst. quality at age 15 0.18 0.12
(0.135) (0.189)
Democracy at age 15 2.01 0.33
(1.652) (2.184)
Societal pol. violence at age 15 -0.70∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗
(0.265) (0.268)
Interstate pol. violence at age 15 -0.33 -0.27
(0.514) (0.528)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77693 77693 77693 77693 77693 77693
R2 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172
Notes: Online Appendix Table A10 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience
on remaining years of life controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed effects,
development and institutional quality experienced at age 15. Additional controls include
subjective math skills, education level, and log household income per capita. Patience is
standardized to exhibit a standard deviation of 100. Standard errors clustered at the country
level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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Table A11: Life Expectancy at Birth and Patience
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remaining years of life 1.66∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗
(0.385) (0.405) (0.405) (0.407) (0.439) (0.445)
Life expectancy at birth -0.078 -0.29∗ -0.26∗ -0.26∗ -0.30∗ -0.26
(0.139) (0.153) (0.150) (0.157) (0.165) (0.172)
1 if female -13.3∗∗∗ -10.7∗∗∗ -10.9∗∗∗ -9.94∗∗∗ -11.5∗∗∗ -10.3∗∗∗
(2.147) (2.074) (2.068) (2.086) (2.126) (2.144)
Subj. math skills 2.25∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.191) (0.218) (0.209) (0.195)
Education level 8.79∗∗∗ 8.83∗∗∗ 9.52∗∗∗ 8.95∗∗∗ 9.91∗∗∗
(1.429) (1.352) (1.398) (1.511) (1.466)
Log [Household income p/c] 3.30∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗
(0.564) (0.556) (0.583) (0.611) (0.630)
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No Yes No No Yes
Religion FE No No No Yes No Yes
Language FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 79433 77693 76793 69245 71987 62691
R2 0.161 0.172 0.218 0.176 0.184 0.232
Notes: Table A11 presents OLS estimates of a regression of patience on remaining years of
life as well as life expectancy at birth controlling for gender, country fixed effects, age fixed
effects, and additional controls that include subjective math skills, education level, and
log household income per capita. Patience is standardized to exhibit a standard deviation
of 100. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ∗∗ p < 0.05.
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C Longevity, Patience, and Poverty Traps
This section presents a simple model that highlights the interdependencies between
patience, longevity, and economic development and illustrates how these interdepen-
dencies can lead to a longevity-patience poverty trap.
Consider an overlapping generations economy. Each generation t has a unit mass
of individuals that live for two periods. Individuals are endowed with one unit
of time during each period, and exhibit heterogeneity with respect to their innate
ability. Ability is distributed uniformly, ai ∼ U [0, 1]. At the beginning of the first
period of life, individuals can decide to either work as unskilled workers throughout
their life or to spend a share of their time e¯ > 0 on acquiring education in order
to work of skilled workers during the second period of life. Individuals with higher
ability acquire more productive knowledge during their education, with productivity
as skilled workers being given by ai. This specification assumes that time spent in
education and individual ability are complements in the education process. Unskilled
individuals earn a wage wLt , while skilled workers receive a wage wHt . For simplicity,
we assume a linear production function, which implies a skill premium of σt > 0
(such that wL/wH = 1/(1 + σ)).12 Individuals discount the future with their time
preference 0 < β < 1 as well as with their expected survival probability until the
second period of life, pit. Then, with logarithmic preferences, the individual chooses
education time ei = {0, e¯} optimally to maximize lifetime utility. An individual
prefers becoming skilled depending on
U(ei = e¯) ≷ U(ei = 0)
⇔ lnwLt (1− e¯) + βpit lnwHt ai ≷ lnwLt + βpit lnwLt
This delivers an ability threshold at which an individual of generation t is indifferent
between becoming skilled and remaining unskilled
a∗t =
(
1
1 + σt
)(
1
1− e¯
) 1
βpit
. (-1)
For a given β, the ability threshold is decreasing and convex in pi, and vice versa.
Without loss of generality, consider as a benchmark a scenario in which all indi-
viduals are endowed with a time preference 1 > β > 0 and let the survival probability
be given by 0 < pi < 1. Moreover, assume that the time cost for education is suffi-
12This allows us to make the main point while endogenizing the wage in a general equilibrium
OLG framework with Y = L+(1+σ)H. Using a neoclassical production function would not deliver
substantially different insights but would ensure interior equilibria throughout.
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ciently high compared to the skill premium such that e¯ > 1 − 1
(1+σ)βpi
. This implies
with β given that for a survival probability of pi or less, the ability threshold is above
1. In other words, no individual, not even the most able, is willing to become skilled.
However, given β an increase in life expectancy, reflected by pit > pi would induce
some individuals of generation t to invest in education.
In the following, we consider a dynamic version of this benchmark scenario that
shows the consequences of endogenizing the survival probability as a function of the
education composition of the population. This will allow us, in a next step, to illus-
trate the broader implications of the empirical finding of individual life expectancy
(i.e., the survival probability) affecting patience. In particular, assume an inter-
temporal externality at the aggregate level (along the lines of Cervellati and Sunde,
2005), where life expectancy, reflected by the survival probability pi, is positively
affected by the share of skilled individuals in the previous generation. For simplicity,
consider a linear relationship between pit and a∗t−1 such as
pit = pi(a
∗
t−1) = p¯i − ζ · a∗t−1 (-1)
where ζ is assumed to be sufficiently large in absolute terms to ensure that pi(1) < pi.
Hence, even with this externality the steady state remains to be characterized by no
individual being willing to become skilled, as characterized by a∗(pi(1)) = 1, pi(1)).
This situation is depicted in Figure B1, where the ability threshold a∗(pi, β) de-
scribed by (C) implies no education acquired by any individual if the survival proba-
bility is at or below pi. Whatever the survival probability to start with is, the steady
state equilibrium of this economy is one of no education (i.e. an ability threshold of
a∗ = 1 and a low survival probability pi(1) that is consistent with no education). In
other words, in this setting the model exhibits a development trap due to a lack of
forward-looking behavior, since for any pi the equilibrium share of skilled individu-
als is smaller (the ability threshold is higher) than what is required to establish an
equilibrium with a higher survival probability than pi.
Now consider the consequences of individual life expectancy in terms of pi affecting
patience as suggested by the empirical results shown before. In particular, consider
the following generalization with
βt = β + ρ(β¯ − β)pit , (-1)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] and 1 > β¯ > β, which relaxes the implicit assumption of ρ = 0
considered so far. Since the condition for the ability threshold (C) implies that an
increase in β shifts the ability threshold down for any pi, thereby increasing the
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Figure B1: A Longevity-Patience Development Trap
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tendency to acquire education.13 Hence, for any pi the ability threshold is lower, i.e.
a∗(pi, β) < a∗(pi, β). Obviously, a sufficiently pronounced shift (a sufficiently high
choice of β¯) implies the emergence of two interior steady states, a stable steady state
that features a strictly positive share of the population acquiring education (in terms
of a∗(p˜i, β(p˜i)) < 1), and a corresponding survival probability p˜i > pi, as well as an
unstable steady state. Figure B2 depicts this situation with the unstable steady state
being characterized by the intersection of the two curves between pi(1) and pi. For
any survival probability above the level of this intersection of the unstable steady
state, the economy will converge to the interior steady state {a∗(p˜i, β(p˜i)), p˜i}, whereas
for any survival probability below that the economy will remain in the steady state
with {a∗ (pi(1)) = 1, pi(1)}.
Obviously, with a stronger effect of longevity on patience (a larger ρ), the positive
feedback loop can even lead to the disappearance of the development trap altogether,
as depicted in Figure B3.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that the empirical finding that life
expectancy influences patience can generate feedback mechanisms that can lead to
poverty traps. Through its effect on individual patience, this feedback amplifies the
effects of low life expectancy for future-oriented decisions long-run development, as
suggested by Cervellati and Sunde (2005, 2015).
13Taking cross derivatives, it becomes clear that the shift of a∗ is more pronounced for smaller
pi.
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Figure B2: Longevity and Patience: Multiple Development Equilibria and Development Traps
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Figure B3: Eliminating the Longevity-Patience Development Trap
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D Data
Staircase procedure The sequence of survey questions that form the basis for the
quantitative patience measure is given by the “tree” logic depicted in Figure C1 for the
benchmark of the German questionnaire. Each respondent faced five interdependent
choices between receiving 100 euros today or varying amounts of money in 12 months.
The values in the tree denote the amounts of money to be received in 12 months.
The rightmost level of the tree (5th decision) contains 16 distinct monetary amounts,
so that responses can be classified into 32 categories which are ordered in the sense
that the (visually) lowest path / endpoint indicates the highest level of patience. As
in the experimental validation procedure in Falk et al. (2015), we assign values 1-32
to these endpoints, with 32 denoting the highest level of patience.
Computation of Preference Indices at Individual Level The individual-level
index of patience is computed by (i) computing the z-scores of each survey item at
the individual level and (ii) weighing these z-scores using the weights resulting from
the experimental validation procedure of Falk et al. (2015). Formally, these weights
are given by the coefficients of an OLS regression of observed behavior on responses
to the respective survey items, such that the coefficients sum to one. These weights
are given by (see above for the precise survey items):
Patience = 0.7115185× Quantitative measure + 0.2884815× Qualitative item
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109AB
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A
B
139
132
122B
136AB
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A
A
B
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169
161
158B
165AB
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173B
181A
A
B
202
193
189B
197AB
210
206B
215A
A
A
A
Figure C1: Decision Tree for the Staircase Time Task, Stakes for Germany
Notes. Numbers correspond to payment in 12 months, A = choice of “100 euros
today”, B = choice of “x euros in 12 months”. The staircase procedure worked as
follows. First, each respondent was asked whether they would prefer to receive
100 euros today or 154 euros 12 months from now (leftmost decision node). In
case the respondent opted for the payment today (“A”), in the second question
the payment in 12 months was adjusted upwards to 185 euros. On the other
hand, if the respondent chose the payment in 12 months, the corresponding
payment was adjusted down to 125 euros. Working further through the tree
follows the same logic.
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